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MINIMIZING PRODUCT LIABILITY ExposuRE:
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR MANUFACTURERS
SIDNEY K. KANAZAWA, J.D."
DAN R. GALLIPEAU, PH.D."
I. INTRODUCTION
How can a manufacturer minimize its risk of product liability in the
United States? The answer is far from simple. No matter how safe the
product, it will not be immune from a U.S. courtroom or public media at-
tack. Products deemed "defective" in U.S. courtrooms and in the public
media have generally been more than 99.99% safe-and in many instances
have been deemed "defective" without rational scientific support. Natural
human sympathy and a general distrust of corporations and government
tends to favor injured and grieving persons over manufacturers of products
that allegedly caused harm. This favoritism exists even if the product com-
plied with all applicable safety regulations.2 The playing field is not level.
Sidney K. Kanazawa is a trial partner at Pillsbury Madison & Sutro LLP, 725 South
Figueroa Street, Suite 1200, Los Angeles, California 90017, phone: (213) 488-7148, fax:
(213) 629-1033, e-mail: kanazawa.sk@pillsburylav.com. Mr. Kanazawa is also a sus-
taining member of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. and American Law Insti-
tute.
Dan R. Gallipeau is President of Dispute Dynamics, Inc., 21253 Hawthorne Boule-
vard, Suite A, Torrance, California 90503, phone: (310) 792-9080, fax: (310) 792-1088, e-
mail: dgallipeau@disputedynamics.com.
1. See Fatal Litigation, FORTUNE, Oct. 16, 1995, at 60 (examining breast implant liti-
gation); RiCHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILrrY MEss: How BusINss CAN BE RESCUED
FROM STATE COURT POLmCS (1988); PErER W. HUBER, LABIUTY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
AND rrs CONSEQUENCES (1988); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or.
1996); PHANTOM RIsK: SCIENTiqc INmRxNCE AND THE LAW (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds.,
1993); Paul Ingrassia, Magazine Gives Ford's Bronco If 'Avoid' Rating, WALL ST. J., May
18, 1989, at 1-6; Laura McGinley, Ford Bronco Has No Safety Defect, U.S. Agency Says,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1990, at A14; Jury Clears Ford Motor of Liability in Rollover Acci-
dent of Its Bronco II, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1993 at B4; Milo Geyelin, Jury Orders Ford to
Pay $25 Million for Death Linked to Bronco lRollover, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1995, at B2.
2. While noncompliance with a safety regulation automatically establishes liability in
most jurisdictions, compliance with safety regulations does not preclude imposition of
1
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Nevertheless, conscientious efforts to create a "good" product for "good"
reasons can level the playing field and minimize a manufacturer's exposure.
Using a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ("FMEA"), we examine how a
manufacturer can shift the balance in its favor.
II. FAILURE MODE: DEFECT OR MISREPRESENTATION
What is the "failure" we are trying to avoid? Basically, it is a finding
(by a jury, judge, media group, consumer group, industry group, or a gov-
ernmental entity) that some injury or damage was caused by a manufac-
turer's product "defect" or "misrepresentation" about its product.
Although product liability is a creation of state law and is not uniform
throughout the United States, there are certain basic rules and concepts that
unify this area of law. Recently, the American Law Institute3 ("ALI") em-
barked on a project to identify and synthesize these underlying rules and
concepts. On May 20, 1997, after more than four years of development, the
ALI membership unanimously approved the Restatement (Third) Torts:
Product Liability (Proposed Final Draft, 1997). This final draft provides an
excellent synthesis of product liability law in the United States.
The Restatement articulates the basic defect rule as follows: "[O]ne en-
gaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells
or distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect." There are three types of defects: manufac-
turing,' design,5 and inadequate instruction or warnings.6 A product is de-
product liability. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) TORTS: PRODUCr LABiL1Ty § 4 (1997).
3. The American Law Institute is an esteemed organization of legal academic scholars,
judges, and lawyers whose charter is to review the common law decisions of courts
throughout the country and create from those decisions a synthesis that will lead to greater
certainty in the law. See RESTATEMENT OF LAW OF CONTRACTS viii, xi-xii (1932). See also
AMERICAN LAW INSnTITUTE, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 20-22 (1973);
James F. Byrne, Jr., Reevaluation of the Restatement as a Source of Law in Arizona, 15
ARIZ. L. RsV. 1021 (1973); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories:
Wisconsin and the American Law Institute, The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wisc. L. REv. 1
(1995).
4. "A product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its in-
tended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing
of the product." RESTATEmENT (THm) TORTS: PRODUCr LiAamrrY § 2(a) (Proposed Final
Draft 1997).
5. The Restatement defines design defects as follows:
A product is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable al-
ternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the com-
mercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe.
Id. at § 2(b). In California and a few other jurisdictions, design defects are determined un-
der a slightly different two-prong consumer expectations and risk/benefit test. Under Cali-
fornia law, a product is defective in design if it: "failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner,...
[Vol. 34
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fective if, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains any one of these
three defects. Additionally, in certain limited circumstances, a defect can be
inferred from the circumstances of the accident.7 Moreover, noncompliance
with a safety rule or regulation will give rise to liability, but compliance will
not automatically exonerate the manufacturer.!
For misrepresentation, the Restatement provides the basic rule as fol-
lows:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes a fraudulent, negli-
gent or innocent misrepresentation concerning the product is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property resulting from such misrepre-
sentation.9
As will be discussed later in this article, however, the decision makers
in product liability lawsuits are lay jurors (and the consuming public) who
often decide from the heart, rather than from esoteric concepts of law.
[or] if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury
and the defendant fails to establish, in light of relevant factors, that on balance the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,455-56 (Cal. 1978).
6. "Inadequate instruction or warning" is defined by the Restatement as:
A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCrLIABILrrY § 2(c).
7. The inference of a defect is discussed by the Restatement as follows:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a prod-
uct defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a specific
defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff: (a) was of a kind that ordi-
narily occurs as a result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case,
solely the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale
or distribution.
Id. at § 3.
8. The consequences of noncompliance and compliance are also addressed in the Re-
statement:
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or
warnings: (a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety stat-
ute or administrative regulation renders the product defective with respect to the
risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation; and (b) a product's com-
pliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is
properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect
to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compli-
ance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.
I& at § 4.
9. Id. at § 17(a) (emphasis added).
1998]
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III. FAILURE EFFECT AND SERIOUSNESS: "FOR WANT OF A NAIL..."
What is the effect of this failure? Claims of product defect or misrepre-
sentation can have many serious corollary consequences. These conse-
quences include: (a) unrecoverable defense costs; (b) high money damages;
(c) adverse publicity; (d) loss of new sales and flood of new lawsuits; (e)
adverse governmental action; and (f) bankruptcy. The mere threat of a de-
fect finding may also trigger these consequences.
Unrecoverable Defense Costs: Even if the company successfully de-
fends every lawsuit, defense costs could drain the company of millions of
dollars that cannot be recovered from the unsuccessful claimants. In non-
contract disputes, court costs may be shifted by the outcome of the case but
attorneys' fees and expenses will not. In high stakes serious injury cases,
plaintiffs and defendants can each spend a million dollars on fees, expenses,
and costs through trial. Even if defendants win at trial, their "sunk" costs
are unlikely to be recovered because most injured plaintiffs who pursue a
litigation remedy do not have sufficient assets to cover even the court costs
in serious product liability litigation.
High Money Damages: Money judgments against the company could be
substantial depending upon the nature and number of injuries. Multi-million
dollar judgments in single injury cases are not uncommon."
Adverse Publicity: A defect finding will probably appear in the popular
media (if it did not begin in the popular media) and negatively affect the
public image of the company. Verdicts against a manufacturer are news-
worthy, but verdicts favoring a manufacturer are not. For instance, the tele-
vision magazine "60 Minutes" aired a program on the rollover propensity of
Jeep CJ-5 vehicles in turning maneuvers,1 and many newspapers ran articles
about verdicts against Jeep in rollover cases.12 However, the popular media
made no mention of a 12-0 design defect defense verdict in favor of Jeep
Corporation after a three-month trial in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
10. See Marilynn Marchione, Jury Awards $1 Million in Latex Glove Lawsuit,
MILWAUKE J. SEMINEML, Feb. 26, 1998, at News 1; Margaret Cronin Fisk, Overall Awards
Shrink But New Trends Emerge, NAT'LL. J, Feb. 23, 1998, at C2; Saundra Tony & Warren
Browm, Driver Burned in Md Crash is Awarded $26 Million in Suit Against Ford,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 14, 1996, at D1; The Verdicts Are In, They're Bigger Than Ever,
NEw JERSEY L. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at S5; Jason Wolfe, Boy, 2, Awarded Millions for Pot-
pourri-Pot Scalding, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 13, 1996, at 1A; Richard Waters, Liti-
gation: GM to Fight $150 Million Injury Award, DAYrONDALY NEWs, June 5, 1996, at 7B;
Dana Coleman, Jersey Nearly Doubles National Trend: Jury Awards Big, NEw JERSEY
LAWYER, March 25, 1996, at 1; Michael A. Riccardi, Study: PI Jury Award Median Up in
1995; Product Liability Bucks Trend; Decreases for Second Straight Year, LEGAL IN-
TELLIGENCER, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1.
11. See Jeep Defenders Still Bristle Over Old '60 Minutes' Show, WALL ST. J., May
23, 1998, at 21.
12. See Joseph B. White, Chrysler Settles Suit Involving Jeep for $11.5 Million, WALL
ST. J., May 5, 1988, at 6; Alan Herbert, Judge Affirms Verdict in Auto Liability Case, J.
COMMERCE, Oct. 22, 1986, at 12A.
512 [Vol. 34
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Amazingly, this lack of media attention occurred during the height of CJ-5
rollover litigation across the country. 3
Loss of New Sales and Flood of New Lawsuits: A single adverse ver-
dict or negative media portrayal may dramatically reduce the sales of new
products and unleash a flood of new lawsuits. Sales of the Suzuki Samurai
and Isuzu Trooper plummeted and lawsuits increased after adverse articles
were published in Consumer Reports.
14
Adverse Governmental Action: A single adverse verdict or negative me-
dia portrayal may invite greater governmental scrutiny and action. In the
silicone breast implant arena, adverse publicity (even without solid scientific
support) prompted the FDA to ban the sale of silicone breast implants in the
United States.'5
Bankruptcy: A combination of the above events can force a company
into bankruptcy. Most of the industry leaders who manufactured asbestos
and silicone breast implants are now in bankruptcy."'
IV. FAILURE FREQUENCY: LOW RISKS ARE IRRELEVANT
What is the frequency of the failure? The objective frequency of a de-
fect finding among the millions of products manufactured each year is actu-
ally quite low. Most of the products on the market have never been the
subject of a product liability lawsuit. And, even among companies that have
been the subject of product liability lawsuits, a large percentage have ulti-
mately obtained favorable verdicts. However, these objectively low fre-
quencies are of little comfort to product manufacturers.
The frequency of plaintiff verdicts in product liability lawsuits is mis-
leading. Ninety-five percent of all cases filed are settled before trial. Most
are settled to avoid the high cost of litigation and a possible adverse verdict.
The actual statistical risks of harm in product liability cases are usually min-
uscuie. Most, if not all, products deemed "defective" by a court or jury were
more than 99.99% safe, and had a statistical risk of causing death or serious
injury of less than 0.01%. A suggested alternative design may arguably re-
13. One of the authors of this article (Kanazawa) was the lead trial lawyer for Jeep
Corporation in the case tried in Los Angeles.
14. See Brian S. Akre, Isuzu Trooper Sales Plummet After Magazine's Rollover
Charge, ASSOCIATED Pass, Oct. 1, 1996, LEXIS/NEXIS; Emily Narvaes, Firms Judged By
How They Handle Crises, DENvER PosT, Aug. 27, 1996, at Al; John O'Dell, Samurai Sales
Plunge Sparks Shuffle at American Suzuki, L.A. TImS, Sept. 26, 1989, at 4-1; Craig N.
Smith, Marketing Strategies for the Ethics Era, SLOAN MGMT. REv., June 22, 1995, at 85;
Follow Up: Some Suzuki Rollovers, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 1998, at 487.
15. See Marlene Cimons, FDA to Restrict Cosmetic Silicone Breast Implants, L.A.
TimES, April 17, 1992, at Al; Susan Peterson, Implant Denounced as a Compromise; Doc-
tors, Women on Both Sides Say FDA Move Political, ORANGE CoTNTY REG., April 17,
1992, at A4; Judy Foreman, Breast Implant Field Altered by FDA Edict, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 13, 1994, at 1.
16. See Louis Sahagun, Dow Corning's Bankruptcy Filing; Asbestos Firm Took the
Same Path, L.A. Tv s, May, 16, 1995, at 13.
1998]
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duce the risk by a factor of ten or one hundred. In other words, a 99.99%
safe product is alleged to be "defective" because it is not 99.999% or
99.9999% safe. 7
However, exact statistical risks pale when serious injury or loss of life
is at issue. In the early "fuel tank fire" trials against Ford Motor Company,"
Ford was chastised for not making its fuel tanks more crashworthy--even
though the risk of drowning in a car and the risk of being killed by a country
mailbox were statistically greater than the risk of dying in a fuel tank fire.
Indeed, although the automotive industry has been a major focus of
product liability litigation, statistically, the risk of death in automobile acci-
dents is extremely small. In 1995, the death rate for motor vehicle accidents
was 15.9 deaths per 100,000 individuals within the United States. The rate
for other causes of death of similar magnitude were: pneumonia, 31.8; dia-
betes, 22.5; suicide, 11.8; and homicide, 8.2. In contrast, the death rate for
cancer was 204.7 and for heart disease 281.2 per 100,000 individuals. The
death rate for all causes was 880 per 100,000 individuals. 9
Although not supported by objective statistics, the public continues to
believe the existence of risky products in the market requires strong legal
measures to ensure public safety.20 Americans are not alone in numeric illit-
eracy.' In Great Britain, the British beef industry was annihilated by the
threat of "Mad Cow Disease." Mass panic arose out of the diagnoses of
twelve individuals who may have become ill from eating British beef. The
population at risk was approximately 60 million. As such, British beef was
roughly 99.99998% safe but the British would not eat it.' It is perception,
not real risks, that drives the potential dangers of product liability.'
17. See supra note 1.
18. One of the authors (Kanazawa) represented Ford Motor Company during the fuel
tank fire litigation in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
19. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1997 (117th ed. 1995).
20. Even with our elaborate and pervasive product liability rules, the United States is
not the safest country in the world with respect to accidental deaths. The accident death
rate in the United States is approximately 37 deaths per 100,000 population. By contrast,
the relative accidental death rate per 100,000 population in Australia is 24.9, in Canada is
32.2, in Costa Rica is 28.9, in Germany is 37, in Greece is 35.7, in Hong Kong is 15.1, in
Japan is 28.1, in Singapore is 17.6, and in the United Kingdom is 21.4. If anything, the
data suggest accident prevention is highest where the law places a high premium on per-
sonal responsibility. See THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC (Andrews & McMeel eds., 1996).
21. See JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988).
22. See P.M. Briefing; Bonn Joins Ban on British Beef, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1990, at
P3; James Tobin, Special Health-Contaminated Cows Provoked a Statewide Cancer
Scare, but 20 Years of Monitoring Show the Fears Were Overblown: PBB Fears Unwar-
ranted, Study Shows, DETROIT NEwS, Aug. 19, 1997, at Al; David Usborne, Gummer States
His Case for Beef, INDEP., June 8, 1990, at 3.
23. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
[Vol. 34
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V. FAILURE MECHANISMS
A. Good vs. Bad
How does "failure" occur? Despite product liability law's apparent ob-
jective focus upon the product, it is the perception of "good" and "bad" that
really determines liability. It is not about real risks. As discussed above,
the real risks are generally very small. It is about deciding which party be-
fore the court of law or public opinion is "good" and which is "bad." Thus,
to win this emotional evidentiary battle, a manufacturer must establish that
its conduct was "good" or, at least, better than the plaintiff's conduct. How
can a manufacturer do this? What factors influence public opinion? The
following discussion may provide answers to these questions.
Jury Selection: At trial, jurors are randomly selected from the commu-
nity at large. The individual juror rarely has any specialized knowledge
about the product or the issues presented. If he or she had any such special-
ized knowledge, one of the parties probably would have seen that knowl-
edge as a disadvantage and would have peremptorily excused that juror from
the panel during jury selection.
Public Arena: Evaluations of a product and its manufacturer in the
public marketplace are no different. The general consuming public has little
appreciation of the real risks and tradeoffs that must be made to manufacture
any product.
Sympathy: In deciding the fate of the parties, jurors and the public look
to human elements for answers. The parties are not equal. One party is a
severely injured person or the grieving family of a deceased or seriously in-
jured person. The other party, a manufacturer, is initially perceived as hav-
ing the money, the power, and the ability to compensate the victim and
make changes in the product to avoid other similar injuries. With nothing
said, the injured consumer begins at an advantage by virtue of the sympathy
his or her injury will naturally generate.
Good vs. Bad: Although the injured customer has the initial advantage,
the two parties rise or fall with the evidence. If the injured person was
careless, drunk, or lying, he or she will fall from an initial favored position
and be labeled "bad." Moreover, if a company appears to be hiding the
truth, seems arrogant, or is callously focused solely on money, the company
will fail even further and will be labeled "bad." In the end, it is the party
that remains higher on the scale of "good" and "bad" that ultimately wins.
Jurors and the public tend to look at three timeless factors in arriving at this
distinction: (1) knowledge, (2) power/ability, and (3) intention/diligence.
On the manufacturer's side, if the manufacturer knew about a problem
and did nothing about it-without any good reason-the manufacturer is la-
beled "bad." If not, the manufacturer may not be "bad" nor liable because it
could not have known about the risk at issue, or had a good reason for not
acting on its knowledge.
19981
7
Kanazawa, and Gallipeau,: Minimizing Product Liability Exposure: Practical Solutions for Ma
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1997
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Similarly, if the manufacturer had the power or ability to correct the
problem and did nothing, was focused solely on money, or was not rigorous
in its safety efforts-without any good reason-the manufacturer is labeled
as "bad." However, if the manufacturer could not have done anything dif-
ferently, did its best under the circumstances, or had a good reason for its
conduct, it could avoid the negative label.
On the injured party side, the same concepts apply. If the injured per-
son knew of the risk and ignored it, he or she is "bad." If the injured person
could have easily avoided the accident (by not drinking or by paying atten-
tion), the injured person is "bad." And, if the injured person shades the truth
to recover money, his or her intentions will be viewed as "bad" and recovery
is unlikely.
B. Public Perception of Manufacturers
The public generally perceives corporations and government as not
worthy of trust, and thus holds strong sympathies for injured people. Ac-
cordingly, the public imposes higher standards of "good" on manufacturers.
The following data from Dispute Dynamics, Inc.'s national database of po-
tential juror attitudes throughout the country is enlightening. The data were
gathered during jury research work on actual cases from 1993 to the pres-
ent.24
While potential jurors generally believe a faultless manufacturer should
not compensate injured people, 39% of potential jurors are prone to com-
pensate seriously hurt people for their losses, even if it was their own fault.
Moreover, most jurors will acknowledge that 100% certainty does not exist
in the real world, but a core group of about 25% tends to ignore all statistics
and focus on the "value of one human life." Rather than seeing 99.999%
safe, they see 0.001% danger. When the consequences are serious, an even
larger percentage of potential jurors tend to overgeneralize the frequency of
rare events leading to those serious consequences. This overgeneralized
concern for serious threats to human life is exacerbated in product liability
trials by a general distrust of companies and government.
When asked whether executives of companies will lie to increase prof-
its, 60% of the potential jurors agreed and only 16% disagreed. A signifi-
cant percentage of potential jurors (35%) would award punitive damages to
punish a company for insensitive acts, even if the company did not intend to
injure anyone.
Most potential jurors also believe government safety standards are too
heavily influenced by business. Potential jurors are almost evenly split on
whether most companies adequately warn consumers of the risks and dan-
gers in using their products, but a significant minority (12%) strongly be-
24. The jury research is a compilation of separate studies over several years. It has
included groups as small as 500 to 600 people and groups as large as 8,000 people.
[V/ol. 34
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lieve most companies do not provide adequate warnings. They are also al-
most evenly split on whether companies fail to properly field test their prod-
ucts. But, potential jurors strongly believe manufacturers are responsible for
determining every way their products might be unsafe.
In the automotive context, potential jurors believe automakers should
make all possible safety items available, even if the potential for using those
items is extremely low. At the same time, there is a strong underlying belief
in personal responsibility that is reflected in automotive product liability
cases. For example, potential jurors tend to believe most injuries from
automobiles happen because people are careless. Potential jurors also tend
not to agree that the manufacturer is at least partly responsible if a person is
injured while using their product, regardless of the circumstances.
Thus, while the potential jurors (and the public) will impose high stan-
dards on manufacturers to insure the safety of their products, the standard is
not insurmountable. If the manufacturer fails to maintain high standards of
being "good," it faces the prospect of not only compensatory damages but
also punitive damages-even if it did not intend to injure anyone. On the
other hand, while the injured person begins with a favorable bias, that bias
will not be sustained in the face of carelessness or other failures in personal
responsibility.
VI. RECOMMENDED ACTION: GOOD REASONS FOR DESIGN AND ACTIONS
What can a manufacturer do to avoid the "failure"? A manufacturer
must not only make a reasonably safe product that minimizes "excessive
preventable danger" but must also establish itself as "good."
To appear "good" in the eyes of the jurors (and public), a manufacturer
must have a reasonably safe product (no "excessive preventable danger")
and "good" reasons for the design, production, and distribution of its prod-
uct. There are many practical ways to tilt the evidentiary balance in a
manufacturer's favor. Several methods are suggested and discussed below.
Of course, these suggestions are not all applicable to every manufacturer as
the realities of the manufacturer's industry or marketplace may make some
of these suggestions difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The list is in-
tended solely as a sample of alternative choices.
A. Organize to Evaluate Designs Early and Regularly
Consumers and jurors do not care about how a product is made. They
25. The concept of "good" and "bad" is similar to the ISO 9000 concept of "quality."
While the pursuit of ISO 9000 certification will not immunize a company from product li-
ability lawsuits, the elements of that pursuit, including safety (a "state in which the risk of
harm (to persons) or damage is limited to acceptable level" (ISO 8402: 2.8)), will promote
the same positive conduct in the areas of knowledge, power/ability, and intention/diligence
that should minimize the company's exposure.
1998]
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care only about the end result. Within companies, however, the concerns
may vary at different stages in the development of a product. Changes to a
design at, the end of the design and production cycle are far more expensive,
if not impossible, than similar changes at the beginning of the process. Pri-
orities and judgments about a product shift as it nears its final production.
Costs will weigh heavily against changes late in the design process, even if
the change will provide a significant incremental advantage in the final
product. Thus, while company employees may agree that the change would
improve the product (or make it safer), the change may not be incorporated
because of when the change was proposed.
The president of a major corporation aptly explained the concept in dis-
cussing a defect that devastated one of its companies' new products. Had
the defect been caught in the design review stage, it would have cost $35 to
correct. Had the company caught it after the design review, but before part
procurement, it would have cost $177 to correct. Had the company caught
the defect after part procurement, but before assembly, it would have cost
$368 to correct. If the company had caught the defect after production, but
before it shipped the product, the defect would have cost $17,000 to correct.
But the defect wasn't caught until the product reached the U.S. marketplace,
and it cost the company $590,000 to correct a $35 defect; 16,500 times the
original expense!26 Organizing to evaluate a proposed design early and
regularly will help reduce the likelihood of increased risks in the final de-
sign.
B. Organize to Minimize Internal Political Fights Over Product Designs
Some of the worst documentation about a product is often created in the
midst of internal political wars. These documents are later used by oppo-
nents to show that the company's own employees were at odds with the final
product that was produced and sold. In such political wars, it is not unusual
to see flamboyant and exaggerated statements about the relative risks of
danger presented by the design. An organizational plan to keep everyone
thinking objectively as a team for the single-minded objective of creating a
product that will meet and exceed the wants and desires of customers-
including the elimination of any "excessive preventable danger" and the
tailoring of the product to fit within acceptable limits of risk-will go a long
way toward minimizing the risks of product liability.
C. Conduct Serious Critiques with Customers (and Competitors)
Creating a reasonably safe design and good reasons for a design re-
quires a concerted effort by everyone in the company. This process cannot
26. This anecdote was discussed by a speaker at a recent DRI product liability seminar
in New Orleans, La. (Feb. 4-6, 1998).
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be thought of as "window dressing." If a review is initiated, the company
must be prepared to act upon recommendations from that review. Other-
wise, the company will be merely creating evidence for an opponent in fu-
ture litigation.
Some may argue that the critiques will independently increase the risk
of product liability. As in all design considerations, there are risks and
benefits in every design choice. A climate for serious critiques does in-
crease the prospects of generating negative documents that opponents can
later use to show that the company itself was not satisfied with a production
model's design. But such critiques also provide opportunities to detect and
correct problems before anyone in the marketplace is affected. The critiques
also show "good" intentions and diligence which will be favorably received
by jurors and the public.
If critiques are conducted, the proposed solution should be empirically
tested with customers and compared to competing products in the market.
An automotive engineering consultant recently illustrated the need for this
empirical testing. An automotive company's customers were complaining
about the lack of brake sensitivity in a particular line of vehicles. According
to customers, too much pressure was required to apply the brakes. In the
face of this criticism, the company's engineers did not believe a change in
brake sensitivity was warranted. They believed reducing foot pressure
would decrease the safety of the vehicle by increasing the likelihood of rear
wheel lockup. But a manager insisted on empirically testing this theory.
Despite the engineers' initial safety assumptions, they found other manu-
facturers used both lighter and heavier foot pressure designs and did not
have rear wheel lockup problems. They also found that customers favored
the lighter pressure design. When lighter pressure designs were ultimately
utilized in subsequent models, the empirical testing proved correct-the
lighter foot pressure designs did not decrease safety or increase the incidence
of rear wheel lockupY
D. Set Guidelines for "Acceptable Levels of Risk"
Using a risk matrix (frequency and severity of risk), the company can
set policies about what is an acceptable level of risk for its products and
processes (See Appendix A).
E. Identify Potential Hazards
To ferret out potential problems in a design, a manufacturer could sys-
tematically identify the hazards potentially lurking in that design. This re-
quires looking at the product from a customer's and bystander's viewpoint.
27. Interview with Charles A. White, Vice President of Engineering, Engineering
Analysis Associates, Inc., Bingham Farms, Mich. (Feb. 4, 1998).
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From a customer's viewpoint, the manufacturer could envision all the
potential circumstances in which its product may be used or abused. This
includes the particular location, application, and users or bystanders that
might be affected by the product's design. A manufacturer's liability is not
limited to intended uses of the product. The manufacturer is responsible for
all reasonably foreseeable uses and abuses of the product. This identifica-
tion of hazards should be for the entire life of the product.
In evaluating the reasonably foreseeable uses and abuses of the product,
a manufacturer may consider:
(1) Expected users, bystanders, processors, and abusers (including age,
mental/physical limitations, size, strength, attentiveness, etc.)
(2) Expected conditions of use (e.g., lighting, environmental surround-
ings, noise, etc.)
(3) Anticipated changes (wear and tear and modifications) during the
life cycle of product
(4) Government and industry standards, codes, and rules for use of the
product and for the industry in which the product will be used
(5) Accident, injury, and damage reports and data for older models of
the product and for competitive products
(6) Accident, injury, and damage reports and data for the entire industry
in which the product will be used
F. Evaluate the Risks
After identifying the potential hazards, the manufacturer can evaluate
the relative risks presented by each of these hazards. This requires an as-
sessment of the likelihood and severity of a particular hazard, and an
evaluation of whether the risks are within the company's "acceptable levels
of risk."2' The safety goal for each product should eliminate "excessive pre-
ventable danger." Every product will fail at some point. And, every prod-
uct can cause some harm. The only two questions are: (1) Under what cir-
cumstances will the product cause harm to persons or property (i.e., will it
work with reasonable safety in the foreseeable uses and misuses of the prod-
uct)?; and (2) Is the product's potential for harm an "excessive preventable
danger" or will the risk of danger be within acceptable limits?29
Acceptable levels of risk can be evaluated by asking the following
questions:
Danger: What is the danger? What danger can arise from the reasona-
bly foreseeable uses and abuses of the product? How likely is the danger
during the life of the product? How severe is the danger? Are there cus-
tomer expectations (created by government regulations, competitor designs,
or the manufacturer's own marketing of the product) inconsistent with the
28. See Appendix A.
29. See id.
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product's design creating an independent false expectation danger?
Prevention: Is the danger preventable? Are there practical alternative
means (by alternative designs or instructions/warnings or advertise-
ments/representations) of reducing or eliminating the danger? What are the
tradeoffs? What are the comparative risks, costs, benefits, and adverse con-
sequences of the alternative design?
Excessive Danger: Is the danger in the current design excessive? Do
the incremental added benefits (of safety and other features) of the proposed
alternative outweigh the risks (costs and adverse consequences) of that alter-
native? Will twelve objective jurors think the manufacturer was "bad" to
have sold the product without reducing the danger (i.e., knowledge,
power/ability, intention/diligence)? Does the manufacturer have a legitimate
and persuasive reason for its design choice? (Cost, difficulty, and lack of
time are insufficient reasons if there is a significant risk of severe human
suffering.)
G. Redesign to Eliminate "Excessive Preventable Danger"'3
If the design presents "excessive preventable danger," the manufacturer
may determine whether alternative designs can reduce that risk to acceptable
levels. This is particularly important if there are other competing products
utilizing different designs with lower levels of risk.
An ocean liner experienced a number of injuries from individuals fal-
ling down a grand staircase in the middle of the ship. Warnings were is-
sued. The accidents continued. Finally, a railing was installed in the center
of the staircase ruining its broad beauty. But after installation, the accident
rates fell. The fix was far better than the warnings.
H. Instruct or Warn to Eliminate "Excessive Preventable Danger"
If a redesign to reduce "excessive preventable danger" is impractical, a
manufacturer may provide instructions and warnings to make sure the user is
aware of the nonreduceable hazards. Instructions and warnings are no sub-
stitute for redesign. But where redesign is impractical, warnings and in-
structions may be the only means of reducing "excessive preventable dan-
ger" to acceptable levels. Sometimes nothing can be done to redesign a
product. A frying pan will always be hot during cooking. An air bag pres-
ents a substantial risk of injury if an individual is less than six inches from
the air bag when it opens.
30. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 562 (1994).
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. Check Advertising and Representations to Eliminate
"Excessive Preventable Danger"
Marketing campaigns, literature, ads, press releases, and presentations
associated with a product may be carefully checked to ensure the statements
about the product are consistent with the product's design and manufacture.
Even if a product's design and manufacture does not present "excessive pre-
ventable danger," the product can be "defective" and create liability for the
manufacturer if it is represented to be something that it is not. This com-
monly occurs when the marketing of the product is not integrated with its
design engineering. Even innocent misrepresentations about the appropriate
uses of the product, its benefits, and its expected performance in particular
circumstances can generate major liability for a manufacturer. Express or
implied representations about the product that are inconsistent with its de-
sign intentions and capabilities will create liability even though the product
might have otherwise been "reasonably safe." This point is illustrated in the
following example.
A series of motor vehicle television ads depicted a particular vehicle
being driven off-road and at a relatively high speed. A plaintiff, who at-
tempted to duplicate these conditions, was injured in an accident. The
plaintiff claimed the defendant's advertisements encouraged the reckless be-
havior.'
J. Create Rapid Feedback Systems
An essential element of risk evaluation is early and accurate information
about the performance of the product. Although distribution systems are
sometimes complicated and corporations are sometimes too large for simple
communication systems, rapid feedback about the actual performance of the
product can protect a manufacturer from liability for basing its judgment on
inadequate information. What is required is information about the manu-
facturer's own products, information about competitive products, and infor-
mation about the market in general (including the legal liability arena). In-
corporation of all the information into the design evaluation process will
ensure decisions that are more sound and defensible in the face of future liti-
gation.
Warranties may be used as a means of gathering field experience with
the product. The warranty encourages purchasers to return to the seller to
identify problems. Since far more than 90% of all dissatisfied customers
never complain and simply shop elsewhere, the opportunity to hear cus-
tomer complaints is invaluable.
31. The television commercial was part of a case wherein one of the authors
(Kanazawa) represented the defendant-company.
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K. Educate Employees About the Role of Product Safety
Enhancing product safety is a state of mind. Manufacturers may train
their employees to understand the following points: (1) production of tech-
nically sound designs is essential but not enough;3 2 (2) there must be legiti-
mate and defensible reasons for the company's design and production
choices; 3 and (3) enhancing "quality" is consistent with reducing s9ety
risks to accetable levels and increasing sales through enhanced customer
satisfaction.
L. Teach Employees How to Write
Much of product liability stems from sloppy writing. Manufacturers
may find it helpful to train their employees to express themselves factually
and with good reasons. In particular, employees may be trained to:
(1) Be factual. Do not speculate-stick to the facts.
(2) Be accurate. Do not exaggerate-be objective.
(3) "Close the loop." Problems identified should be solved.
Additionally, employees may also be instructed to:
(1) Reduce paper. Too many sheets can create gaps of information
(because one sheet is missing) and create arguments for improper hiding of
information.
(2) Write constructively-do not shift blame. Write for constructive
purposes, not to "CYA."
(3) Put discussions in context. Discussions about cost and money are
cold in the face of injury and should be avoided, but such discussions are
part of reality and must be viewed in a larger context.
(4) Be conscious of data paths. Understand where writings and data
(e.g., e-mail) can travel, be stored, and can later be retrieved even after hard
copies have been destroyed.
(5) Obey the document retention policy. Incomplete compliance may
unfairly create sinister impressions.
M. Understand Design Improvement Is a Continual Process
"Closing the loop" does not mean incorporating every potential im-
provement that someone has thought of in the next production model. De-
sign improvements will continue year after year and, hopefully, every new
model will be an improvement over the last model. Design engineering is a
practical activity that balances a number of competing factors in every
32. See supra Part IV.
33. See supra Part V.
34. See Matt Murray, GE Sees $100 Billion in 1998 Revenue Due to Quality Control,
Asia Investment, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1998, at A4.
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model.
Although "loops" for improvement will always be open, "loops" for a
particular model can be "closed" by using the risk analysis described above.
Each "open" issue for a production model should be "closed" by using a risk
analysis to help describe the manufacturer's reason for going forward with
production of the current model. In essence, the analysis should lead to a
reason why the company believes the current model does not contain
"excessive preventable danger," and is within acceptable levels of risk (e.g.,
risk is small, danger is small; and change in design will eliminate beneficial
design, or will create other increased hazards). This does not mean there
will be no further improvement with respect to the component at issue, nor
does it mean that the recommendations will not be incorporated in a future
improved model. All that is indicated by this analysis is the company's rea-
son for believing the current design does not contain "excessive preventable
danger" and is within acceptable levels of risk.
N. Develop Risk Context Material
It would help clarify the judgments of company employees if the manu-
facturer provided some contextual risk information. The manufacturer may
find it useful to describe the acceptable levels of risk for its products. It may
also be helpful if the manufacturer provided:
(1) Risk frequency data
(2) Risk severity data
(3) Competitive product risk data
(4) Industry standard risk data
(5) Overall relative risk data
Employees should understand they are creating a "reasonably safe"
product with "acceptable levels of risk" and without "excessive preventable
danger." They are not creating, and cannot create, a "risk-free" product.
0. Create Forms and Systems
Forms are helpful to streamline communication and thinking during the
design, development, and production of a product.
P. Create Workable Document Retention Policy and Management System
A document retention policy and management system may encourage
organized and legitimate destruction and management of documents, with-
out the appearance of hiding. But the policy and system must conform with
the way the company conducts its business. An elegant policy or system
that is not followed is worthless and potentially dangerous.
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Q. Create a Crisis Team
A crisis team may be assembled to be ready to respond when a product
liability issue arises. This team could also serve as a review committee that
helps ensure closure of all "open loops." The team may include:
(1) Advanced planning and design engineers
(2) Production and manufacturing engineers
(3) Service and parts personnel
(4) Marketing personnel
(5) Customer service personnel
(6) Finance personnel
(7) Public relations staff or consultants
(8) Attorneys
The team should work together before a crisis to develop efficient
working relationships and high levels of trust and understanding, before a
crisis arises.
R. Obtain Sensible Insurance
Unlike other types of claims, product liability claims cannot be consid-
ered or insured in isolation. Insurers generally focus upon the financial im-
pact of a single claim, and approach resolution of that claim based on the
economics of that single claim. Some insurers will recognize that the reso-
lution of a single claim should consider the effect of that resolution on all
other products covered by the insurer. But a manufacturer must take a
broader view. A single design defect claim can directly impact an entire line
of identically designed products over several years (regardless of the insurer
for each year), and can adversely affect the company's market reputation and
the sales of all of its other products. As such, an insurer's sensitivity to the
costs of litigation affecting a single claim or product line during a particular
set of years may be inconsistent with the manufacturer's concerns about the
overall exposure and risk created by the claim on the entire company. Con-
sequently, some large manufacturers self-insure to very high levels so that
they can single-handedly control the course of the litigation for the benefit
of the entire company's product lines. Other manufacturers obtain insurance
from companies sensitive to the multiple product effect of a single resolu-
tion in product liability litigation.
S. Develop a Consistent Defense Strategy
To be credible and persuasive in litigation, a company should develop a
consistent defense strategy. Since product liability arises from the manu-
facture, design, warnings/instructions, and advertising for entire lines of
products, the defense of product liability cases cannot focus solely on a sin-
gle claim. The defense strategy must consider the effect of that strategy on
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all other existing and potential claims, and on the marketing of future prod-
ucts. Likewise, the development of new products must be done with an
awareness of its effect on the company's defense strategies for existing
products. A lack of consistency will expose the company to increased li-
ability for both the old products and the new "improved" products.
While there is no single "right" strategy for product liability, the
strength and flexibility of any strategy is highly dependent upon how the
company addresses the issues discussed above. For example, it is difficult
to effectively pursue an early resolution strategy, or even an aggressive de-
fense strategy, if the company lacks "good" reasons for its designs. Both
strategies will lack strength and credibility due to an absence of a real po-
tential to prevail at trial. By contrast, if the company has thought through its
reasons and has legitimate and defensible reasons for its design, both strate-
gies are open to the manufacturer because of its potential strength at trial.
T. It Starts from the Top
All of the measures discussed above are meaningless unless there is a
serious commitment to being a "good" company dedicated to customers
that pervades the company. It must start from the top. "Window dressing"
will be seen as insincere and will create the potential for greater liability
(i.e., cover up). Moreover, what goes on within the company may not be
kept secret. Ex-employees (especially disgruntled employees) may provide
vital information to opponents if the company was less than sincere in its
actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Minimizing product liability exposure requires more than simply pro-
ducing a reasonably safe product with acceptable levels of risk, and without
"excessive preventable danger." It also requires company-wide organization
and individual employee conduct consistent with timeless principles of
"good" conduct in the areas of knowledge, power/ability, and inten-
tion/diligence. In short, minimizing exposure requires "good" designs and
"good" reasons for the product's design, manufacture, instructions and
warnings, and advertising.
[Vol. 34
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 34 [1997], No. 2, Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol34/iss2/15
1998] MINIMIZENG PRODUCT LIABILrTY EXPOSURE
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